Fallor ergo sum
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Fallor, ergo sum
In een passage uit De civitate Dei (boek XI, sectie 26) schrijft Augustinus een aantal zinnen die moderne lezers direct doen denken aan Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum. Hieronder het originele citaat. Eerst de context. Augustinus begint met de vaststelling dat hij er volledig zeker (mihi certissimum est) van is dat hij a. bestaat (esse me) en b. dat hij dat weet (idque nosse) en c. dat hij daarvan geniet (amare).1 De argumenten van de skeptici (in Augustinus’ tijd noemden die zichzelf de ‘Academici’) dat dat allemaal helemaal niet zeker is omdat zintuigen vaak bedrieglijke info verschaffen, vindt hij niet bepaald indrukwekkend. Immers: zelfs als je door je zintuigen bedrogen wordt (en je je dus vergist – het Latijnse woord ‘fallor’ kan beide betekenen), dan nog veronderstelt dat dat er een ‘jij’ is dat bedrogen wordt, dat zich vergist. Zelfs als je je vergist, is er dus een subject dat zich vergist; en ookal zou het object van zijn kennis incorrect zijn, dan nog zou de blijdschap die hem dat foutieve inzicht verschaft, reëel zijn. Dus niet ‘cogito, ergo sum, maar ‘fallor, ergo sum’ :
Ik word misleid, dus ik besta; of:
Ik vergis me, dus ik ben.
Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido, dicentium : quid si falleris ? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest, ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum si fallor, quomodo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me novi esse, non fallor.»
De civitate Dei, XI, 26.
Vertalingen/translation
fallor = ik word misleid, dus ik ben
Ik ben niet onder de indruk van de argumenten van de Academici tegen deze waarheden als ze zeggen: ‘Wat als je misleid wordt? Want: als ik word misleid dan besta ik. Wie niet bestaat, kan niet misleid worden; en daarom geldt: ik besta als ik misleid word. En omdat ik besta als ik misleid word, hoe kan ik me dan misleid worden qua mijn bestaan, omdat het zeker is dat ik besta als ik misleid word. Ookal word ik misleid, ik moet bestaan omdat ik word misleid. Daarom geldt dat ik niet word misleid, als ik met zekerheid vaststel dat ik besta.
fallor = ik vergis me, dus besta ik
Ik ben niet onder de indruk van de argumenten van de Academici tegen deze waarheden als ze zeggen: ‘Wat als je je vergist ? Want: als ik me vergis, besta ik. Wie niet bestaat, kan zich niet vergissen; en daarom geldt: ik besta, als ik me vergis. En omdat ik besta als ik me vergis, hoe kan ik me dan vergissen (in te zeggen) dat ik besta, wanneer/omdat het zeker is dat ik besta als ik me vergis. Omdat ik, ookal vergis ik me, toch besta, daarom vergis ik me niet als zonder enige twijfel vaststel dat ik besta.
English: I am deceived, so I am
I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, ‘What if you are deceived?’ For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am.
Niet slecht zo … ruim een millennium voor René Descartes.
De Civitate Dei, BOOK XI [XXVI]
Original: Latin
Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo valde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo brevius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas veri similis turbat. Non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, velut colores videndo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas cogitatione versamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur; sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his veris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest; ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia ergo sum si fallor, quo modo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me novi esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me novi nosse, non fallor. Sicut enim novi esse me, ita novi etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque amorem quiddam tertium nec inparis aestimationis eis quas novi rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar; quamquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare verum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum vero et illa vera atque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor verus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non esse beatus velit. Quo modo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?
Translation: English
And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him,-being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him,-is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance. For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us,-colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by touching,-of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real? Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?